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BETWEEN FREEDOM AND DESPAIR: EXISTENTIAL 
CHALLENGES AND CONTRIBUTIONS TO PERSON-
CENTRED AND EXPERIENTIAL THERAPY 
 
ABSTRACT 
This article explores a range of contributions that existential thinking may be able to 
make to the theory and practice of person-centred and experiential therapy. It begins 
with an overview of existential philosophy and the development of existential 
therapies, and then goes on to look at four aspects of existential theory and practice 
that may be of particular value to person-centred and experiential practitioners: a 
phenomenological exploration of freedom and choice; an appreciation of the 
challenges and limitations of existence; an understanding of human being as 
fundamentally with-others; and an understanding of human beings as meaning-
seeking creatures in a world where there are no given, ultimate meanings. On this 
basis, the article argues that existential thinking can provide a counterbalance to some 
of the implicit biases within the person-centred and experiential worlds, and that it can 
help person-centred and experiential practitioners develop deeper levels of empathy 
and acceptance with their clients.  
 
KEYWORDS 
Existentialism, existential therapy, freedom, meaning, critique of person-centred and 
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INTRODUCTION 
For many years, person-centred and experiential therapists have shown a keen interest 
in existential ideas and therapeutic practices. Rogers dialogued with many of the great 
existential thinkers of his day, including Buber, Tillich and May (see Kirschenbaum 
and Henderson, 1990); and Gendlin (1970) examined in detail the relationship 
between existential thinking and his focusing-oriented approach. More recently, a 
number of key figures within the person-centred and experiential fields have drawn on 
existential ideas, concepts and philosophies in developing their approaches to 
therapeutic practice (for instance, Mearns and Thorne, 2000; Schmid, 2002; Swildens, 
2002; Van Kalmthout, 2002; Worsley, 2001).  
 
Given, however, the breadth of the existential domain, there is much of this field that 
remains un-explored from a person-centred and experiential perspective. Furthermore, 
most of the writings from Gendlin (1960) onwards have tended to explore the 
commonalities between person-centred/experiential and existential approaches – such 
as the challenge to scientistic objectivism (Gendlin, 1970; Rogers, 1969), the 
emphasis on I-Thou encounters (Worsley, 2001), and a holistic, embodied and 
‘process’ understanding of human experiencing (Gendlin, 1970; Rogers, 1969; 
Worsley, 2001) – rather than areas of difference and challenge. A third reason why 
there is a continuing need to explore the relationship between person-
centred/experiential and existential approaches is because of the recent emergence of 
a ‘British school’ of existential analysis (see Cooper, 2003, ch. 7), which presents new 
challenges – as well as new areas of commonality – to person-centred and experiential 
practitioners. The aim of this article, then, is to examine several aspects of existential 
thinking and practice that have yet to be fully explored from a person-centred and 
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experiential standpoint, and to discuss the challenges and contributions that they may 
be able to make to person-centred and experiential approaches. The paper begins, 
however, with a brief introduction to existential philosophy and the therapeutic 
approaches that have emerged from it. 
 
EXISTENTIAL PHILOSOPHY AND THERAPIES 
Existential philosophy, at its most fundamental level, can be understood as a reaction 
to systems of thought that tend to de-humanise the lived-actuality of human existence. 
Søren Kierkegaard (1992) and Friedrich Nietzsche (1967), generally considered the 
fathers of existential thought, railed against nineteenth century scientific, religious and 
philosophical systems of belief – most notably G. W. F. Hegel’s (1949) ‘absolute 
idealism’ – which tended to reduce human existences down to deterministically-
related essences or bit-players within a grand historical narrative. Instead, they argued 
that each human being should be understood in terms of his or her individual, 
concrete, subjective human existence. Twentieth century existential philosophers, like 
Jean-Paul Sartre (1958) and Martin Heidegger (1962), developed these ideas, and 
incorporated into them the phenomenological method of Edmund Husserl (1960), 
through which they strove to describe something of this human lived-existence. 
Existential philosophers have described this existence in many different – and, at 
times, divergent - ways, but a number of common themes have tended to emerge in 
their writings: that human existence is unique, verb-like, freely-choosing, future-
orientated, limited, in-the-world, with-others, embodied, open to guilt and anxiety, 
and able to choose whether to ‘authentically’ face these givens of existence or 
‘inauthentically’ turn away (Cooper, 2003). 
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From the 1920s onwards, a disparate number of psychiatrists and psychotherapists 
began to turn to these ideas as a basis for their clinical practice. Foremost amongst 
these was Ludwig Binswanger (1963), a Swiss psychiatrist, who drew on Heidegger’s 
(1962) Being and Time, Buber’s (1958) I and Thou, and Karl Jasper’s (1963) 
phenomenological psychiatry to propose a more holistic, humanistic and relational 
means of understanding psychological distress. Binswanger’s work came to form the 
basis for ‘Daseinsanalytic’ psychotherapy (see Boss, 1963), a Heideggerian form of 
psychoanalysis which is still practiced on the European continent today. In the early 
1930s, the Austrian psychiatrist, Viktor Frankl, also began to develop an existentially-
informed approach to psychotherapy, which drew particularly from the German 
phenomenologist, Max Scheler (see Frankl, 1988). Frankl’s ‘logotherapy’ or 
‘Existential analysis’, put particular emphasis on helping clients to find meaning in 
their lives, and adopted a relatively didactic therapeutic approach. In the 1950s, 
existential approaches to therapy spread to the United States, principally through the 
work of Rollo May (see May, Angel and Ellenberger, 1958), who combined the more 
individualistic insights of the earlier existential philosophers – particularly 
Kierkegaard (1980) – with a broadly humanistic outlook. This ‘existential-humanistic’ 
approach to psychotherapy has retained a high profile in the United States – and, 
indeed, worldwide – through the writings of some of May’s highly gifted mentees, 
including Irvin Yalom (see Yalom, 1980), James Bugental (see Bugental, 1981), and 
Kirk Schneider (see Schneider, 2003). The late 1950s and early 1960s also saw the 
emergence of an existential approach to therapy in the United Kingdom, through the 
work of the Scottish psychiatrist R. D. Laing (see Laing, 1965). Laing drew on the 
teachings of Binswanger and Jaspers – as well as existential philosophers like Sartre 
and Buber – to develop a particularly phenomenological, de-pathologising account of 
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schizophrenia and other forms of mental distress. Drawing on Sartre (1976), Laing 
also explored the kinds of tangles, deceits and misunderstandings that can beset 
human relationships (see Laing, 1969; Laing, Phillipson and Lee, 1966). Laing, 
himself, moved away from an existential standpoint in many of his later writings (see, 
for instance, Laing, 1976) but his emphasis on de-pathologising clients and striving 
for an egalitarian therapeutic relationship was developed by such followers as Emmy 
van Deurzen (2002), who went on to found the ‘British school of existential analysis’ 
in the early 1990s. 
 
EXPERIENCING FREEDOM 
In attempting to put the concrete actuality of human existence back in to an 
understanding of human beings, existential thinkers and practitioners have placed 
particular emphasis on the human capacity for freedom and choice (for instance, 
Sartre, 1958). From an external, ‘objective’ standpoint, it may be possible to view 
human beings as causally determined mechanisms, but from the inside of human 
experiencing, choice and volition are ineradicable aspects of our being-towards-the-
world.  
 
Existential psychologists and therapists have also tried to say something about how 
we actually experience freedom and choice. Some of the most original writing in this 
domain comes from the American psychiatrist, Leslie Farber (2000), who 
distinguished between automatic, ‘unconscious’ willing; and deliberate, wilful choice-
making. These ideas were developed by Rollo May (1969), who identified a number 
of elements in the experiencing of choice: ‘intentionality’: the basic human tendency 
to ‘stretch’ towards something; ‘wishing’: ‘the imaginative playing with the 
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possibility of some act or state occurring’; and ‘willing’: ‘the capacity to organise 
one’s self so that movement in a certain direction or towards a certain goal may take 
place’ (1969, p.218).  
 
Like the existentialists, Rogers places great emphasis on the human capacity for 
freedom, and the centrality of choice to the process of psychotherapy and personality 
change (see, for instance, Rogers, 1961; Rogers, 1977; Rogers and Freiberg, 1994). In 
recent years, however, person-centred and experiential writers have tended to neglect 
this dimension of human experiencing (though see Finke, 2002; Worsley, 2001). In 
Rogers’ writings, too, there is a tendency to leave unexplored the actual 
phenomenological experiencing of choice. More significantly, perhaps, some of the 
core concepts within a person-centred understanding of human being can be seen as 
neglecting, if not negating, the role of choice in the process of personal change. The 
notion of ‘growth’ (Rogers, 1961), for instance, and the widespread appropriation of 
biological and naturalistic metaphors to articulate this process (Finke, 2002), tends to 
portray human development as a spontaneous, automatic process, rather than one that 
also involves agency, choice and active decision-making. Potatoes in a basement bin, 
for instance, do not choose to send their sprouts upwards. Similarly, Rogers’ (1959) 
notion of actualisation as an ‘inherent’ ‘motivation’ tends to suggest that human 
beings are impelled along a particular path; without the capacity to choose between 
self-neglect and self-maintenance, self-destruction and self-enhancement. Of course, 
Rogers’ theory does allow for the possibility of a movement towards self-destruction 
and self-alienation, but the attribution of this movement to an external factor – 
conditional positive regard – betrays an even more a-volitional sentiment at the heart 
of his thinking. As Rollo May writes: ‘If you conclude that the trouble lies in the fact 
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that human beings are so susceptible to influence by their culture, so obedient to 
orders that they are given, so pliable to their environment, then you are making the 
most devastating of all judgements on…human beings. In such a case we are all 
sheep, dependent upon whoever is the shepherd’ (1990, p.244).  
 
Existential and person-centred/experiential views of freedom and choice also contrast 
in that, from the former perspective, one could argue that it is simply not possible to 
make generalised statement about the kinds of choices that people should make: 
whether, for instance, it is better for them to follow their own instincts or conform to 
the demands of others, symbolise felt-experiences or leave them un-symbolised. This 
contrasts, somewhat, with the person-centred and experiential fields, in which certain 
ways of being – for instance, ‘an increasing trust in one’s organism’ or ‘increasingly 
existential living’ (Rogers, 1961) – tend to be associated with more mature levels of 
development. Mearns and Thorne (2000) write here of a ‘tyranny of growth’, in which 
experiences that are perceived as forward moving and ‘growthful’ tend to be valued 
over those that are seen as restraining or socially mediated. In contrast to this, 
existential therapists like Emmy van Deurzen (2002) have written of the ‘dilemmas of 
existence’, arguing that, at all times, we are pulled between the poles of various 
dualities, neither of which are intrinsically right. At some times, then, it may be better 
to conform to the demands of others, and at other times it may be better to follow our 
own instincts. Here, the only certainty is that choices are difficult, fraught and 
uncertain – there is no guarantee that if we ‘go with the process’ everything will work 
out for the best, or that if we do what is best for ourselves, it will also be best for 
others. From an existential perspective, then, human development is not like stepping 
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aboard a conveyor belt, but like coming to a series of crossroads, each of which forces 
us to make a particular choice as to how to proceed. 
 
Following on from this, a further contrast between existential and person-
centred/experiential views of freedom and choice is that the former tends to place a 
greater emphasis on the more discomforting aspects of this experiencing. Whilst 
Rogers (1961) equates the experiencing of freedom with the ‘good life’, existential 
philosophers like Kierkegaard (1980) and Sartre (1958) have also highlighted the 
ways in which freedom can bring with it such feelings as anxiety, guilt and dread. 
This is for a number of reasons. First, as Yalom puts it, ‘alternatives exclude’ (2001, 
p.148). That is, in choosing one thing, we are unavoidably choosing against 
something else, and there is always the anxiety-evoking possibility that we may reject 
the better alternative. Second, the more we experience ourselves as free, the more we 
are likely to feel responsible for the course of our lives, as well as for the impact that 
we may have on the lives of others. From an existential perspective, then, an increased 
acknowledgement of our freedom may also bring with it an increased openness to 
such feelings as regret, remorse and guilt, as well as an awareness of our ethical 
responsibility to respond to the call of the Other (Schmid, 2002). Third, the more we 
experience ourselves as free and as beings who can choose who we want to be, the 
more we may come to perceive that there is nothing solid or certain at the core of our 
identity: that we are essentially a hollow ‘nothingness’ (Sartre, 1958) that chooses and 
creates its own essence.  
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THE LIMITATIONS OF EXISTENCE 
From an existential perspective, then, the more an individual acknowledges their 
freedom, the more they may be likely to experience such feelings as anxiety, guilt and 
emptiness (Kierkegaard, 1980; Sartre, 1958). For existential therapists such as van 
Deurzen (2002), however, such feelings are not only corollaries of freedom, but 
ineradicable aspects of human life. Life, as van Deurzen states, is hard, tough, rough 
and unfair, filled with crises, disappointments, injustices and failures (1998; 2002). It 
is, she continues, an ‘endless struggle where moments of ease and happiness are the 
exception rather than rule’ (1998, p.132). This position contrasts somewhat with the 
more optimistic outlook of the person-centred perspective, which holds that it is 
possible for human beings to move towards a ‘good life’ (Rogers, 1961). This, as 
Rogers makes clear, is not a state of unending happiness, but there is little mention of 
the anxieties, struggles, and discontentments that may continue to beset this way of 
being.  
 
As Swildens (2002) notes, Rogers also tends not to acknowledge the unavoidable 
limitations of human existence. Indeed, he explicitly states that such issues as death 
and loneliness were no subjects to be dwelled upon. In contrast, existential 
philosophers and therapists have put great emphasis on the fact that human freedom 
runs up against unavoidable ‘limitations’, ‘boundary situations’, or ‘givens’ (Cohn, 
1997; Heidegger, 1962; Jaspers, 1932; Sartre, 1958). Heidegger and Jaspers place 
particular emphasis on the boundary condition of death: the fact that our being is a 
being-towards-demise, ending, not on the summit of actualisation, but over the cliff 
top in the abyss of annihilation. For Heidegger, however, the key point here is not that 
we will one day die, but that, at some level of consciousness, we have a knowledge 
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that our lives are rapidly and unavoidably hurtling towards that demise. Hence, we 
can not help but be anxious in the face of the limited possibilities that we have 
available, and experience guilt and regret for the possibilities and potentialities that 
we did not – and may never – actualise   
 
For Heidegger (1962), another given of existence is ‘thrownness’: the fact that we are 
born into a particular social, historic and economic context that is not of our making 
or choosing. Hence, existential philosophers have argued that we can not determine 
our beginnings, can not determine our endings, and throughout our lives are rocked 
and swayed by a ‘huge tide of accident’ (Jaspers, 1932).  
 
From an existential standpoint, then, individuals who experience intense and enduring 
feelings of anxiety, regret or helplessness may not necessarily be suffering from some 
form of pathology. Rather, they may be very much in touch with the realities of their 
– or human – life (Laing, 1965; Spinelli, 1994). Here, again, there is something of a 
contrast with the person-centred and experiential fields, which retain elements of a 
more medical worldview, by tending to associate such experiences as anxiety or self-
alienation with psychological maladjustment and a lack of congruence between the 
self-concept and experiential field (Rogers, 1959). Existential thinking, then, throws 
into question many our assumptions about what is ‘dysfunctional’, ‘impaired’, 
‘abnormal’ or ‘maladjusted’. Could it be, for instance, that individuals who 
experience ‘difficult processes’ (Warner, 2001) are actually more aware of the 
uncertainties, contingency and fragilities of human existence than those who are 
functioning ‘optimally’? 
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INTERSUBJECTIVITY 
Yalom (1980) suggests that another given of human existence is that we are 
inexorably alone. Existential philosophers, however, have tended to place greater 
emphasis on the fact that we are inextricably intertwined with others (for instance, 
Buber, 1958; Heidegger, 1962; Marcel, 1949; Merleau-Ponty, 1962).  
 
Buber (1958), for instance, argues that the ‘I’ never exists in isolation, but is always 
related to an Other, and that this relationship can take one of two forms: an ‘I-It’ form 
and an ‘I-Thou’ form. In the I-It attitude, the Other is experienced as a thing-like 
object: an entity that can be categorised, analysed and broken down into essences. By 
contrast, in the I-Thou attitude, the Other is beheld, accepted and confirmed as a 
unique totality. For Buber, such an I-Thou attitude requires a meeting with the Other 
as they are in the present – with the true otherness of the Other – rather than a self-
reflexive encounter with one’s own expectations and/or needs. For Buber, such an I-
Thou encounter also requires the I to take the risk of fully immersing itself in the 
relationship, of allowing it to be affected and changed it ways that it could not predict.  
 
Clearly there are parallels here between Buber’s (1958) notion of the I-Thou attitude 
and Rogers’ (1957) conception of the ideal therapeutic relationship; and, despite the 
efforts of some commentators (for instance, Friedman, 1985) to emphasise the 
differences between the two, much of this would seem to be relatively spurious (see 
Anderson and Cissna, 1997; Schmid, 2001). With respect to the theory and practice of 
person-centred and experiential therapies, however, it is useful to highlight two areas 
of contrast. First, for Buber, the I-Thou relationship requires the I to fully hold on to 
his or her otherness in the face of the Thou, for without difference, no true dialogue or 
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encounter could take place. Such a position, then, lends support to a more dialogical 
conception of person-centred therapy (see, for instance, Schmid, 2002) than one in 
which the therapist is a reflecting mirror, or ‘neutral’ presence, to the client. Second, 
for Buber (1988), the need for positive regard is not understood as ‘a secondary or 
learned need, commonly developed in early infancy’ (Rogers, 1959, p.208) – as 
Rogers and his group construed it in some of their most dubious theoretical 
speculation (see Standal, 1954, p.29)i – but as the most basic human yearning. He 
writes:  
The human person needs confirmation because man [sic] as man needs it…. Sent 
forth from the natural domain of species into the hazard of the solitary category, 
surrounded by the air of chaos which came into being with him, secretly and 
bashfully he watches for a Yes which allows him to be and which can come to him 
only from one human being to another. It is from one man to another that the 
heavenly bread of self-being is passed. (1988, p.61) 
 
In contrast to Buber, other existential philosophers have taken a more sceptical view 
towards human relational possibilities. Sartre (1958), in particular, has tended to 
portray relationships as inherently conflict-ridden, unfulfilling and frustrating, and is 
well known for describing hell as ‘other people’. For Sartre, we have an inherent 
tendency to ‘it’-ify others, and because we know others are viewing us as objects too, 
human relationships become a battle of objectify-or-be-objectified. Such a battle, 
according to Sartre, takes on even more ominous proportions in ‘loving’ relationships, 
where we strive to possess the love of another, yet want that love to be freely given. 
Here, then, there is a strong contrast with Rogers’ (1961) more optimistic view of the 
possibilities and potentialities for human relating. 
 
Some of the most interesting attempts to develop Sartre’s work on interpersonal 
relationships has been undertaken by Laing (1965; 1969; Laing et al., 1966). In 
discussing the aetiology of schizophrenia, for instance, Laing argued that a key factor 
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was the individual’s experience of being de-personalised and ‘petrified’ (i.e. turned 
into an object) by those around him or her, and having his or her experiences denied. 
Indeed, for Laing, it was the denial that any denial was taking place that frequently 
drove an individual most forcefully towards their own inner, phantasy world. From a 
person-centred and experiential perspective, however, perhaps the most valuable 
aspect of Laing’s work is his exploration of interpersonal perceptions and ‘meta-
perceptions’ (Laing et al., 1966): the realm of ‘social phenomenology’. Meta-
perceptions are an individual’s perceptions of the way an other perceives him or her, 
and Laing argued that a disjunction between an individual’s meta-perceptions, and the 
actual perceptions that others hold of him or her, could lead to a significant break-
down in interpersonal – and intrapersonal – well-being. If, for instance, I perceive you 
as confident and self-assured, but you think I perceive you as relatively vulnerable, 
then my attempts to ‘knock you off your pedestal’ might be perceived by you as a 
deliberate assault on your greatest vulnerabilities. If you then respond with anger and 
aggression, I may then interpret this as your confidence-expressing-itself-as-
arrogance, with the result that I may try and knock you down further, to which you 
defend more, ad infinitum. Whilst the experiential approaches to therapy, then, have 
done much to help us understand the nature of human experiences, Laing’s 
interpersonal phenomenology promises to take this a step further: towards 
understanding the complex, interpenetrative relationship between one person’s 
experiences and those of another.  
 
For existential philosophers such as Heidegger (1962), however, our intertwinement 
with others go beyond the purely dyadic level, towards the societal and cultural 
spheres. Such a radical intersubjectivity is rooted in Heidegger’s understanding of 
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human being as fundamentally tool-using and practically engaged in its world. For 
Heidegger, our being is not first and foremost a private, internal experiencing, but an 
in-the-world doing, in which the tools we use are an integral part of our existence. At 
the level of immediate experiencing, for instance, the keyboard that I am typing on is 
not something separate and distinct from me, but an integral part of my typing-these-
words-here. Only when I press the wrong key or focus specifically on the keyboard 
does it become something distinct from my personal ‘I’. Given, then, that this 
keyboard has been constructed by people other than me, my existence-at-this-moment 
is inextricably infused with the existence of others. More importantly, however, my 
very thinking about these ideas – indeed, my thinking in general – is based on the 
socially-constructed tool of language. At every moment of my being, then, the 
sociocultural world that I inhabit is also inhabiting me – I am inseparable from my 
social environment.  
 
Such a radically intersubjective position challenges the idea that an individual can 
ever fully be ‘themselves’: autonomous, independent and with an entirely internalised 
locus of control. Indeed, along the lines of Holdstock (1993), it raises the possibility 
that the very notion of a discrete and individual ‘self’ – a concept at the heart of much 
person-centred thinking and practice – is actually the product of a particular Western 
discourse. More broadly, however, Heideggerian thinking – and the social 
constructionist movement that has emerged from it (e.g. Gergen, 1999) – challenges 
person-centred and experiential therapists to acknowledge that all our beliefs and 
assumptions are ultimately part of a particular worldview – the ‘discourse of person-
centred and experiential therapies’ – and not reified truths about how things ‘actually’ 
are. Such an understanding, then, calls on person-centred and experiential therapists to 
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reflect on our assumptions and biases. Within the experiential therapies, for instance, 
there is a tendency to assume that it is helpful for people to access and symbolise their 
‘emotions’, ‘feelings’ or ‘felt-senses’ (Gendlin, 1996; Greenberg, Watson and 
Goldman, 1996). More fundamentally, there is an assumption that there are such 
‘things’ as emotions or felt-senses to be accessed and symbolised. The radically 
intersubjective position outlined above would not necessarily question the tremendous 
therapeutic potential of such assumptions, but it would encourage us to be mindful of 
the fact that such assumptions are exactly that, and not fixed and unalterable truths 
about the human conditionii. The value of such an awareness is that we can then be 
more careful about imposing these assumptions upon clients who may have very 
different worldviews. It allows us, for instance, to be more accepting of, and less 
directive with, a client who says that he doesn’t feel it is right for him to ‘get in touch’ 
with his emotions; or who, indeed, feels that it is not useful to think about himself in 
these terms.  
 
MEANING, MEANINGLESSNESS AND AUTHENTICITY 
Alongside these characteristics of human existence, existential philosophers, most 
notably Heidegger (1962), have also argued that human beings are fundamentally 
future-orientated. That is, our way of being is not caused or determined by events in 
our past, but directed towards goals and possibilities in our future. In understanding 
how a client experiences his or her world, then, existential therapists may be as 
concerned with helping clients explore their future possibilities and meanings as they 
may be with helping them explore their pasts (cf. Bohart, 2001). Indeed, Frankl’s 
logotherapy is specifically concerned with helping clients discover the meaning of 
their lives, and of the particular situations that they encounter. In contrast to Frankl, 
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however, many existential philosophers (for instance, Camus, 1955; Sartre, 1958) and 
therapists (for instance, Yalom, 1980) have argued that there are no given, external or 
ultimate meanings in our lives to be discovered – only personal meanings that we can 
create for ourselves. For if we are free, then we must also be responsible for the life-
meanings that we construct; and if we are beings-towards-death, then all our projects 
and meanings must be transitory and passing; and it we are inextricably immersed 
within a sociocultural nexus, then all the meanings we have ascribed to our lives are 
ultimately only social constructions, with no extrinsic or final meaning or value. 
 
For Heidegger (1962), this latter realisation – that we are ‘interpretation all the way 
down’ (Dreyfus, 1997, p.25) – brings with it feelings of anxiety, dread and 
unsettledness. It is as if we suddenly realise that our whole world is nothing but a 
stage set and we are merely playing a part: absorbed in a world of empty constructs 
and roles that only give the illusion of some ultimate meaning-motivating action 
(Dreyfus, 1997). Heidegger describes our being-in-the-world at those moments of 
realisation as ‘authentic’: for whilst we have not stepped out of the sociocultural 
nexus of meanings, we have understood it for what it is. Here, it is interesting to note 
that Heidegger’s concept of ‘authenticity’ is rather more specific than Rogers’ (1957) 
concept of ‘congruence’ or ‘genuineness’. It is not just about being true to one’s 
existence, but about being true to the feelings of anxiety and dread that arise from an 
acknowledgement of one’s fundamental meaninglessness and nothingness. 
Furthermore, from a Heideggerian perspective, human beings do not start off as 
congruent wholes only later to fall in with the social world. Rather, in our thrownness 
we are intrinsically and inherently fallen into the social world, and can only later gain 
some authentic awareness of it.  
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 DISCUSSION 
In this article, I have argued that person-centred and experiential therapies, like all 
therapeutic practices, are permeated with certain assumptions and biases. In particular, 
I have argued that there is a tendency within the person-centred approach – and, to 
some extent, the experiential ones – to adopt a relatively optimistic perspective on the 
human condition: a belief that human beings can actualise their potential and grow 
towards a fully-functioning ‘good life’. As biases go, this is by no means an un-
therapeutic one, and there is plenty of evidence to suggest that a therapist’s optimism 
and hope for the client is a key element in the successfulness of the therapy (Snyder, 
Michael and Cheavens, 1999). Nevertheless, from a person-centred, 
phenomenological standpoint, such a bias can also lead to difficulties in the 
therapeutic work. First, it can mean that therapists are less able to fully accept, and 
empathise with, certain aspects of their client’s experiences: in particular, feelings 
such as hopelessness, despair, confusion, emptiness, meaninglessness, interpersonal 
frustration and dread. There is no suggestion here that person-centred or experiential 
therapists will be dismissive or critical towards such feelings, but there may be a 
tendency to see them as less-than-optimal, pathology-related ways of being that are in 
need of ‘working through’. Second, it can mean that therapists have implicit 
assumptions about the direction in which clients should be moving in. Third, and this 
is something I have particularly witnessed in trainee counsellors, it can mean that 
therapists become frustrated, anxious or disturbed when their clients do not appear to 
be improving and moving in the ‘right’ direction. In this article, I have also suggested 
that the discourse of person-centred therapy may tend to de-value clients’ affiliative 
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needs – particularly the need for confirmation from others – such that these 
experiences may also receive less confirmation from person-centred therapists.  
 
Existential thinking, then, may be an ideal source of balance to some of the biases that 
can emerge within the person-centred and experiential approaches, leading to a more 
accepting, empathic, phenomenological and non-directive way of working; and also 
one that is more in keeping with the contemporary postmodern zeitgeist (e.g. Lyotard, 
1984). First, it provides a philosophical framework in which a therapist can truly 
accept and validate a client’s more discomforting feelings – as well as his or her need 
for interpersonal confirmation – perceiving these as intelligible, meaningful and 
entirely valid ways of experiencing the world that are no less mature or healthy than 
such feelings as optimism, autonomy or creativity. Put another way, it can help 
therapists to fully accept their clients as they are now, rather than as who they might 
be once they have ‘worked through’ their difficulties. Second, it can help person-
centred and experiential therapists move away from a position of knowing which 
direction – albeit at the most general level – that clients need to move in, towards a 
genuine stance of ‘un-knowing’ (Spinelli, 1997); in which there is a deep respect for, 
and empathy with, the client’s struggles and uncertainties in the face of the dilemmas 
of existence. Here, then, the therapist genuinely does not know whether it is better for 
the client to trust their own intuition or listen to the voice of others, change or stay as 
they are; and whilst the therapist may have their own ideas about which direction a 
client should move in, they recognise these as part of a particular sociocultural 
discourse, rather than as an ‘objective’ and reified truth. Moreover, in being faced 
with the most unanswerable of questions – ‘What is the meaning of it all?’ – 
existential thinking reminds person-centred and experiential practitioners of the limits 
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of their knowledge and techniques, and the fact that we are all novices in the face of 
life’s mysteries. Finally, Laing’s (Laing et al., 1966) interpersonal phenomenology 
can help person-centred and experiential therapists move further away from a 
pathologising perspective, by construing psychological difficulties in terms of clashes 
of interpersonal praxis, rather than as internal – or externally-caused – pathologies of 
functioning. 
 
Without doubt, then, existential thinking challenges certain aspect of person-centred 
and experiential therapy – particularly at the more optimistic, individualistic and 
medicalised end of the spectrum. In this article, however, I hope to have shown that 
person-centred and experiential therapists can gain much from continuing to engage 
with existential ideas (as, undoubtedly, the reverse is also true). More specifically, I 
believe that existential ideas can play a significant part in the development of a 
radically accepting, radically de-pathologising and radically humanistic form of 
person-centred therapy, in which clients are genuinely accepted and confirmed for 
who they are, as they are now, with all the struggles and difficulties and dilemmas 
that they confront. Ultimately, then, existential thinking does not undermine the 
person-centred project, but has the potentiality of deepening and furthering it. Perhaps 
this is because, despite the divergences in philosophical and psychological opinion, 
both approaches are fundamentally committed to understanding human beings in the 
most dignified, respectful, and validating way possible.  
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i Drawing on behaviourist – and highly mechanistic – assumptions, Standal (1954) argues that the 
infant develops a need for positive regard because he or she comes to associate perceived differences in 
the experiential field of another – identified through such affiliative behaviours as smiling, cooing, and 
fondling – with the satisfaction of more ‘primary’ needs, such as the need for food, warmth, liquid and 
relief from pain.  
ii This, then, is a very different reading of the relationship between existentialism and psychotherapy to 
Gendlin’s (1970), who equates the existentialist concept of existence with ‘gut sentinence’ or ‘bodily-
felt experience’, and thereby adopts a more modernist reading of existential ideas. 
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